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Abstract 
We construct a growth model with an explicit government role, where more government 
resources reduce the optimal level of private consumption and of output per worker. In the 
empirical analysis, for a panel of 108 countries from 1970-2008, we use different proxies 
for government size and institutional quality. Our results, consistent with the presented 
growth model, show a negative effect of the size of government on growth. Similarly, 
institutional quality has a positive impact on real growth, and government consumption is 
consistently detrimental to growth. Moreover, the negative effect of government size on 
growth is stronger the lower institutional quality, and the positive effect of institutional 
quality on growth increases with smaller governments. The negative effect on growth of 
the government size variables is more mitigated for Scandinavian legal origins, and 
stronger at lower levels of civil liberties and political rights. Finally, for the EU, better 
overall fiscal and expenditure rules improve growth.
JEL: C10, C23, H11, H30, O40




Working Paper Series No 1399
November 2011
Governments tend to absorb a sizeable share of society’s resources and, therefore, they 
affect economic development and growth in many countries. However, despite necessary, 
government intervention is not a sufficient condition for prosperity, if it leads to the 
monopolization of the allocation of resources and other important economic decisions, and 
societies do not succeeded in attaining higher levels of income.  
The existing literature presents mixed results as to the relationship between government 
size and economic development. On the one hand, the former may impact economic 
growth negatively due to government inefficiencies, crowding-out effects, excess burden 
of taxation, distortion of the incentives systems and interventions to free markets. On the 
other hand, government activities may also have positive effects due to beneficial 
externalities, the development of a legal, administrative and economic infrastructure and 
interventions to offset market failures.
Our paper includes several contributions: i) we construct a growth model allowing for 
an explicit government role, we characterize the conditions underlying the optimal path of 
the economy and determine the steady-state solutions for the main aggregates; ii) we 
analyse a wide set of 108 countries composed of both developed and emerging and 
developing countries, using a long time span running from 1970-2008, and employing 
different proxies for government size and institutional quality to increase robustness; iii) 
we build new measures of extreme-type political regimes which are then interacted with 
appropriate government size proxies in non-linear econometric specifications; iv) we make 
use of recent panel data techniques that allow for the possibility of heterogeneous dynamic 
adjustment around the long-run equilibrium relationship as well as heterogeneous 
unobserved parameters and cross-sectional dependence; vi) we also deal with potentially 
relevant endogeneity issues; and vii) for an EU sub-sample we assess the relevance of 
numerical fiscal rules in explaining differentiated GDP and growth patterns. 
Our results show a significant negative effect of the size of government on growth. 
Similarly, institutional quality has a significant positive impact on the level of real GDP 
per capita. Interestingly, government consumption is consistently detrimental to output 
growth irrespective of the country sample considered (OECD, emerging and developing 
countries). Moreover, i) the negative effect of government size on GDP per capita is 
stronger at lower levels of institutional quality, and ii) the positive effect of institutional 
quality on GDP per capita is stronger at smaller levels of government size.  
On the other hand, the negative effect on growth of the government size variables is 
more attenuated for the case of Scandinavian legal origins, while the negative effect of 
government size on GDP per capita growth is stronger at lower levels of civil liberties and 
political rights. Finally, and for the EU countries, we find statistically significant positive 
coefficients on overall fiscal rule and expenditure rule indices, meaning that having 
stronger fiscal numerical rules in place improves GDP growth.  
Non-technical summary  
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1. Introduction 
Governments tend to absorb a sizeable share of society’s resources and, therefore, they 
affect economic development and growth in many countries.1 Throughout history high 
levels of economic development have been attained with government intervention. Where 
it did not exist, little wealth was accumulated by productivity economic activity. However, 
despite necessary, government intervention is not a sufficient condition for prosperity, if it 
leads to the monopolization of the allocation of resources and other important economic 
decisions, and societies do not succeeded in attaining higher levels of income.  
In addition, economic progress is limited when government is zero percent of the 
economy (absence of rule of law, property rights, etc.), but also when it is closer to 100 
percent (the law of diminishing returns operates in addition to, e.g., increased taxation 
required to finance the government’s growing burden – which has adverse effects on 
human economic behaviour, namely on consumption decisions). This idea is related to the 
so-called “Armey Curve”, after Richard Armey, who borrowed a graphical technique 
popularized by Arthur Laffer, whose crucial underpinnings were already present in Dupuit 
(1844). Friedman (1997) suggested that the threshold where government’s role in 
economic growth is between 15-50% of the national income.  
The existing literature also presents mixed results as to the relationship between 
government size and economic development. On the one hand, the former may impact 
economic growth negatively due to government inefficiencies, crowding-out effects, 
excess burden of taxation, distortion of the incentives systems and interventions to free 
markets (Barro, 1991; Bajo-Rubio, 2000). Indeed, several studies report that the efficiency 
of government spending can increase, either by delivering the same amount of services 
with fewer resources or by using more efficiently existing spending levels (see Afonso et 
al., 2005, 2011). Moreover, Slemrod (1995) and Tanzi and Zee (1997) find a negative 
impact if the size of government exceeds a certain threshold. The rationale behind this 
argument is that in countries with big governments the share of public expenditures 
designed to promote private sector productivity is typically smaller than in countries with 
small governments (Folster and Henrekson, 2001). On the other hand, government 
activities may also have positive effects due to beneficial externalities, the development of 
_____________________________
1 According to the Wagner’s Law the scope of the government usually increases with the level of income 
because government has to maintain its administrative and protective functions, its attempts to ensure the 
proper operation of market forces and provision of social and cultural (public) goods. 
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a legal, administrative and economic infrastructure and interventions to offset market 
failures (Ghali, 1998; Dalagamas, 2000).  
Our motivation also comes from Guseh (1997) who presents a model that differentiates 
the effects of government size on economic growth across political systems in developing 
countries. Growth in government size has negative effects on economic growth, but the 
negative effects are three times as great in non-democratic systems as in democratic 
systems. 
Our paper includes several novel contributions: i) we construct a growth model 
allowing for an explicit government role, we characterize the conditions underlying the 
optimal path of the economy and determine the steady-state solutions for the main 
aggregates; ii) we analyse a wide set of 108 countries composed of both developed and 
emerging and developing countries, using a long time span running from 1970-2008, and 
employing different proxies for government size and institutional quality to increase 
robustness; iii) we build new measures of extreme-type political regimes which are then 
interacted with appropriate government size proxies in non-linear econometric 
specifications; iv) we make use of recent panel data techniques that allow for the 
possibility of heterogeneous dynamic adjustment around the long-run equilibrium 
relationship as well as heterogeneous unobserved parameters and cross-sectional 
dependence (e.g. Pooled Mean Group, Mean Group, Common Correlated Pooled 
estimators, inter alia); vi) we also deal with potentially relevant endogeneity issues; and 
vii) for an EU sub-sample we assess the relevance of numerical fiscal rules in explaining 
differentiated GDP and growth patterns. 
Our results show a significant negative effect of the size of government on growth. 
Similarly, institutional quality has a significant positive impact on the level of real GDP 
per capita. Interestingly, government consumption is consistently detrimental to output 
growth irrespective of the country sample considered (OECD, emerging and developing 
countries). Moreover, i) the negative effect of government size on GDP per capita is 
stronger at lower levels of institutional quality, and ii) the positive effect of institutional 
quality on GDP per capita is stronger at smaller levels of government size.  
On the other hand, the negative effect on growth of the government size variables is 
more attenuated for the case of Scandinavian legal origins, while the negative effect of 
government size on GDP per capita growth is stronger at lower levels of civil liberties and 
political rights. Finally, and for the EU countries, we find statistically significant positive 
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coefficients on overall fiscal rule and expenditure rule indices, meaning that having 
stronger fiscal numerical rules in place improves GDP growth.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two presents the theoretical 
model, which underlies and motivates the empirical specifications. Section three addresses 
data-related issues. Section four elaborates on the econometric methodology and presents 
and discusses our main results. Section five concludes the paper. 
2. Model and Econometric Specification 
In this section we present a growth model that relates output and government size and 
it will provide the theoretical motivation for our empirical (panel) analysis in Section 3. 
We consider a typical economy with a constant elasticity of substitution utility function of 









where c is per capita consumption,  is the intertemporal substitution and  is the 
(subjective) time discount rate or rate of time preference (a higher implies a smaller 
desirability of future consumption in terms of utility compared to utility obtained by 
current consumption. Population (which we assume identical to labour force, L) grows at 
the constant rate n, that is, tniit ieLL 0 . Output in each country i at time t is determined by 
the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
1( ) ,0 1,  0 1,  0 1it it it it itY K G A L . (2) 
Y is the final good, used for private consumption, G  is public consumption 
expenditure, which proxies for government size, and K  is the stock of physical capital. We 
consider the case of no depreciation of physical capital.  The output used to produce G
equals qG  (which one can think of as being equivalent to a crowding-out effect in private 
sector’s resources). A  is the level of technology and grows at the exogenous constant rate 
, that is, we have
iiti It
iit eAA 0  (3) 
with itI  being a vector of institutional quality, political regime, legal origin and other 
related factors that may affect the level of technology and efficiency in country i at time t,
and i  is a vector of (unknown) coefficients related to these variables. In this framework, 
the state of labour-augmenting technology (A) depends not only on exogenous 
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technological improvements determined by , but also on the level of institutional quality 
(such as the rule of law), the degree of democratic political foundations, etc. Institutions 
may be critical in facilitating technological breakthroughs, which may not occur without 
appropriate sound institutional environments. The presence of efficient and effective 
institutions ensures that labour can be used for productive purposes, instead of being 
wasted with red tape or rent seeking activities (North, 1990; Nelson and Sampat, 2001). 
We begin by writing down the resource constraint for this economy in per worker 
terms, given by: 
itttttttt nkqgcykqGCYK  (4) 
where tK  is the time derivative of physical capital and small letters represent per worker 
terms (after scaling down by L).
We now write the conditions that characterize the optimal path for the economy and 
determine the steady-state solution for private and public consumption and income per 
















max . (5) 
Solving the Hamiltonian’s corresponding first order conditions and after some 






















A special case occurs when 1 and 0n  in which there is no transition 
dynamics and the economy is always in the balanced growth path. 
We refrain from making full considerations on the model’s solution, but one, in 
particular, is worth making:3 an increase in q (which implicitly proxies the overall size of 
the public sector translating the fact that more resources are needed/required to finance G)
reduces both the optimal level of private consumption per worker (and physical capital per 
_____________________________
2 See the Appendix B for full derivation. 
3 In an alternative setting in which the government introduces a tax over total income (or production) to 
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worker) and, more importantly, the optimal level of output per worker in this model 
economy. 
We now bridge the theoretical model with an appropriate regression equation that will 
serve that basis for our econometric analysis. Therefore, and in line with the empirical 
growth literature, assume the economy is in the steady state. Then output per effective 
worker ( itititit LAYy /ˆ ) is constant while output per worker ( ititit LYy / ) grows at the 
exogenous rate . In general, output in effective worker terms evolves as 
)()(ˆ ititit gky and in (raw) worker terms, output evolves according 
to )()( itititit gkAy . Taking logs on both sides we get itititit gkAy lnlnlnln ,
and using (3) and the fact that in (2) we have 1)( itit LA entering the utility function, we 
obtain,
itititiiit gkItAy lnln)1()1(ln 0 . (7) 
Equation (7) describes the evolution of output per worker (or labour productivity), as a 
function of a vector of institutional and political related variables, which may change over 
time, the size of the public sector or government, the level of physical capital and the 
exogenous growth rate of output. In terms of the theoretical model’s predictions previously 
discussed, one would then expect  to be negative if larger governments do have a 
detrimental effect on economic performance. Given the production function relationship, 
(7) is valid both within and outside the steady-state and this is important, particularly, if 
one makes use of static panel data techniques for estimation purposes. Moreover, it is not 
dependent on assumptions on the behaviour of savings, hence offering a reasonable basis 
for estimation. Based on (7), we will use both a linear and non-linear specification (in 
which interaction or multiplicative terms are included), as follows: 
ititititit gbkbIbtbby lnlnln 54310  (8) 
ititititititiit gIbgbkbIbtbby )(lnlnln 654310  (9) 
where the b’s are (unknown) parameters to be estimated, itI  and itg  denote the proxies for 
institutional quality and government size, respectively, and it  and it  are model specific 
error terms satisfying the usual assumptions of zero mean and constant variance. Equations 
(8) and (9) provide the basis for the empirical models to be estimated in Section 3. 
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The dataset consists of a panel of observations for 108 countries for the period 1970-
2008. The sample countries are grouped into developed (OECD) and emerging and 
developing based on the World Bank classification. Annual data on real GDP per capita (y)
and gross fixed capital formation (inv) are retrieved from the World Bank’ World 
Development Indicators. We estimate the capital stock (Ky) using the perpetual inventory 
method, that is, 1)1( ttt KyIKy , where tI  is the investment and  is the 
depreciation rate. Data on tI  comes from Summers and Heston’s PWT 6.3 as real 
aggregate investment in PPP. We estimate the initial value of the capital stock ( 0Ky ), in 
year 1950 as )/(1950 gI  where g is the average compound growth rate between 1950 and 
1960, and is the depreciation rate (set to 7% for all countries and years).
Our proxies of government size (g) will be the respective Gwartney and Lawson’s 
(2008) composite variable (govsize). This variable includes government consumption 
expenditures (as a percentage of total consumption), transfers and subsidies (as a 
percentage of GDP), the underlying tax system (proxied by top marginal tax rates) and the 
number of government enterprises. We also make use of total government expenditures 
(totgovexp_gdp), government consumption (govcons_gdp) – as in our theoretical model - 
and, finally, total government debt (govdebt_gdp). The first two variables come from a 
merger between WDI, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Easterly’s 
(2001) datasets.4 The latter was retrieved from the recent IMF’s historical debt series due 
to Abas et al. (2010). 
For institutional-related variables (our I) we rely on: i) the Polity 2 (polity) measure and 
regime durability in years (durable) (from Marshall and Jaegger’s Polity’s 4 database), ii) 
Freedom House’s Political Rights (pr), Civil Liberties (cl) and composite index (fh)5, iii) 
the corruption perception index (cpi) (from the Transparency International database), iv) an 
index of democratization (demo) due to Vanhanen (2005), v) a governance index 
(governance)6 from Kaufman et al. (2009) (World Bank project), vi) the political system 
(ps), a dummy variable that takes a value zero for presidential regime, the value one for the 
assembly-elected presidential regime and two for parliamentary regime (from the Database 
_____________________________
4 The classification of the data is described in IMF (2001). 
5 Constructed by simply averaging Political Rights and Civil Liberties. 
6 This is the result of averaging six variables: voice and accoutability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. 
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of Political Institutions), and vii) countries’ legal origins, English (bri), French (fre), 
German (ger) or Scandinavian (sca)7 (from La Porta et al., 1999).8
For robustness purposes we will also make use of factor analysis and combine different 
sets of institutional-related variables (in particular, pr, cl, polity, demo and cpi) and then 
look at the first common factor. However, the sampling technique is unfortunately 
restricted to the fact that cross-country data are limited in the country coverage and vary 
widely across different data sources. This limitation creates an incomplete data issue and 
poses a problem for the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) that we wish to employ. 
Indeed, PCA is based on an initial reduction of the data to the sample mean vector and 
sample covariance matrix of the variables, and this cannot be estimated from datasets with 
a large proportion of missing values (Little and Rubin, 1987).9 Hence, imputation is 
required prior to extracting the first principal component.10 The Expectation-Maximization 
Algorithm (EMA) as suggested by Dempster et al. (1977) is used to fill in missing data. 
This algorithm is based on iterating the process of regression imputation and maximum 
likelihood and it consists of two steps: the first step, the “E (expectation)-step” computes 
expected values (conditional on the observed data) and the current estimates of the 
parameters. Using the estimated “complete data”, in the second step or “M-step”, the EMA 
re-estimates the means, variances and covariances using a formula that compensates for the 
lack of residual variation in the imputed values.11
The first principal component is normalized in such a way that high values indicate 
higher institutional quality. Our standardized index, EMA_PCA, can be written as:12
_ 0.78 0.89 0.92 0.69 0.34EMA CA cl pr polity demo cpi
In addition, the first principal component explains 73.6% of the total variance in the 
standardized data.13 This aggregate index will be used in some of the regressions discussed 
in Section 3.3. 
_____________________________
7 There is no risk of multicollinearity since “socialist” legal origin is not included explicitly on the right-
hand-side as an explanatory variable. 
8 Data sources and definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
9 Moreover, the lack of data also increases the degree of uncertainty and influences the ability of draw 
accurate conclusions. 
10 The varimax rotation method, which is an ortogonal rotation of the factor axes to maximize the variance of 
the squared loadings of a factor on all variables in a factor matrix, is chosen. 
11 The EMA assumes that the data are missing at random (MAR) and in order to check that the MAR 
assumption can be applied to the measures of institutional quality, a test analysis called “separate variance t-
test”, in which rows are all variables which have 1% missing or more, and columns are all variables, is 
carried out. The p-values are more than 5% meaning that missing cases in teh row variable are not 
significantly correlated with the column variable and this, can be considered as MAR. 
12 A likelihood ratio test was used to examine the “sphericity”case, allowing for sampling variability in the 
correlations. This test comfortably rejects sphericity at the 1% level with a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy equal to 0.831. 
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For illustration purposes, Figures 1.a-b and 2.a-b present evidence for a sample of 108 
countries supporting the unclear relationship between real GDP (in levels and growth rates) 
and two different proxies of government size (the Gwartney and Lawson’s (2008) 
composite variable and total government expenditures as share of GDP – see Section 3.1 
for details). Hence, there is a need to shed light on this relationship with appropriate 
empirical methods. 
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The variation of causality between government size and growth detected in cross-
section and time-series papers suggests that there are important differences in the way in 
                                                                                                                                                                               
13Given that the PCA is based on the classical covariance matrix, which is sensitive to outliers, we take one 
further step by basing it on a robust estimation of the covariance (correlation) matrix. A well suited method is 
the Minimum Covariance Determinant (MCD) that considers all subsets containing h% of the observations 
and estimates the variance the mean on the data of the subset associated with the smallest covariance matrix 
determinant - we implement Rousseeuw and Van Driessen's (1999) algorithm. After re-computing the same 
measure with the MCD version we obtain similar results, meaning that outliers are not driving our factor 
analysis (the correlation coefficient between the two equals 98,04%, statistically significant at 1% level). 
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which governments influence economic performance across countries. We argue that it 
may reflect, lato sensu, institutional differences across countries and, while this is a 
plausible conjecture, there is as yet little direct evidence to confirm that institutions and 
political regimes make a difference to the way in which governments affect economic 
outcomes.  
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1 Baseline Results 
Equations (8) and (9) can be estimated directly using panel data techniques which 
allow for both cross-section and time-series variation in all variables and present a number 
of advantages vis-à-vis standard Barro-type pooled cross-section estimation approaches 
(see Greene, 2003).
Table 1.a and 1.b present our first set of results for the pooled OLS and fixed-effects 
specifications, respectively (the former is presented for completeness). Both tables are 
divided into two panels (A and B) covering different proxies for institutional quality (eight 
in total). At this point, we use Gwartney and Lawson’s government size measure only and 
discuss its individual inclusion in our regression of interest as well as its interaction with a 
variable itI .
[Tables 1.a, 1.b] 
A few remarks are worth mentioning. There is a positive effect of the capital stock on 
the level of real GDP per capita throughout the different specifications regardless of the 
institutional variable employed. One also finds a consistent and statistically significant 
negative coefficient on the government size (less so when fixed-effects are used – Table 
1.b). Similarly, institutional quality has a consistent and statistically significant positive 
impact on the level of real GDP per capita (more mitigated with fixed-effects). Finally, 
when statistically significant the interaction term is negative, meaning that i) the negative 
effect of government size on GDP per capita is stronger at lower levels of institutional 
quality, and ii) the positive effect of institutional quality on GDP per capita is stronger at 
smaller levels of government size. The interaction term means that the marginal effect of 
government size will differ at different levels of institutional quality. However, this result 
depends on the proxy used for itI . Nevertheless, we obtain in most regressions 
considerably high R-squares. Moreover, when regional dummies are included, coefficients 
keep their statistical significance and sign. 
15
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If we redo the exercise with the EMA_PCA variable instead, for both pooled OLS and 
fixed-effects estimators, Table 2 shows meaningful results for the size of the government 
and for the institutional quality index, when OLS is considered. 
[Table 2] 
4.2 Endogeneity Issues and Dynamic Panel Estimation 
In the analysis of empirical production functions, the issue of variable endogeneity is 
generally of concern. Moreover, instead of estimating static equations, we now allow for 
dynamics to play a role. Hence, we reformulate our regression equation(s) and take real 
GDP growth per capita as our dependent variable being a function of lagged real GDP per 
capita, investment (gross fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP), a government-size 
proxy and an interaction term (with an institutional quality proxy) – as common practice in 
the empirical growth literature. We estimate this new specification by means of the 
Arellano-Bover system-GMM estimator14 which jointly estimates the equations in first 
differences, using as instruments lagged levels of the dependent and independent variables, 
and in levels, using as instruments the first differences of the regressors.15 Intuitively, the 
system-GMM estimator does not rely exclusively on the first-differenced equations, but 
exploits also information contained in the original equations in levels. 
Another novelty of this paper is the construction of new (and more meaningful) 
democracy measures based on the variable polity (presented in Section 3 and described in 
the Appendix A). The role of political systems and democracy in particular, on the 
government size-growth relationship is assessed by regressing three structural aspects of 
democracy (to be defined below) on 5-year averages of real GDP per capita growth rates.16
Indeed, polity does not capture two important dimensions of political regimes - either their 
_____________________________
14 The GMM approach estimates parameters directly from moment conditions imposed by the model. To 
enable identification the number of moment conditions should be at least as large as the number of unknown 
parameters. Moreover, the mechanics of the GMM approach relates to a standard instrumental variable 
estimator and also to issues such as instrumental validity and informativeness. 
15 As far as information on the choice of lagged levels (differences) used as instruments in the differences 
(levels) equation, as work by Bowsher (2002) and, more recently Roddman (2009) has indicated, when it 
comes to moment conditions (as thus to instruments) more is not always better. The GMM estimators are 
likely to suffer from “overfitting bias” once the number of instruments approaches (or exceeds) the number 
of groups/countries (as a simple rule of thumb). In the present case, the choice of lags was directed by 
checking the validity of different sets of instruments and we rely on comparisons of first stage R-squares. 
16 An equation with real GDP per capita growth as the dependent variable is motivated by (standard) 
augmentation of Solow-Swan type models with a government size proxy (similarly to our production 
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newness (following, for example, democratization or a return to authoritarian rule) or their 
more established (consolidated) nature.
Therefore, Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) define a major political regime change to have 
occurred when there is a shift of at least three points in a country’s score on polity over
three years or less. Using this criterion we define new democracies (ND=1) in the initial 
year (and subsequent four years) in which a country’s polity score is positive and increases 
by at least three points and is sustained, ND=0 otherwise. Established democracies (ED=1) 
are those new democratic regimes that have been sustained following the 5 years of a new 
democracy (ND). In any subsequent year, if established democracies (ED) fail to sustain 
the status of ND, ED=0. Using these criteria, they define sustained democratic transitions 
(SDT) as the sum of ND and ED. They use the same procedure, mutatis mutandis, to 
define new autocracies (NA), established autocracies (ES) and sustained autocratic 
transition (SAT). 
This yields six distinct binary-type measures of the character of political regimes - ND, 
ED, NA, EA, SDT, and SAT - for most years during 1970-2008. Finally, Rodrik and 
Wacziarg (2005) define small regime changes (SM) as changes in polity from one year to 
the next that are less than three points.17 A recent empirical application of these measures 
to explain the impact of extreme-type political regimes on economic performance can be 
found in Jalles (2010). There are several advantages from creating these new measures, 
which allow us to distinguish the impact of new and established electoral democracies and 
autocracies on economic development, and also to assess the impact of sustained 
democratic and autocratic transitions on economic growth. 
Endogeneity18 between right-hand side measures of democracy and autocracy and a 
standard set of control variables is corrected for by taking a system-GMM (SYS-GMM) 
approach – as detailed above. As suggested in Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1997), Hall 
and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Dollar and Kraay (2003), the democracy 
measures are instrumented by: 
1. the durability (age in years) of the political regime type (durable) retrieved from 
Marshall and Jaeggers’ database.19
_____________________________
17 Thus SM = 1 for a small regime change and SM = 0 otherwise. 
18 And also the existence of possible measurement errors when accounting for democracy. 
19 The average age of the party system is also used in Przeworski et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2001). This 
potential instrument is also in line with Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) who document the use of 
the state antiquity index as an appropriate instrument for institutional quality. 
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2. latitude (from La Porta et al., 1999): Hall and Jones (1999) launched the general 
idea that societies are more likely to pursue growth-promoting policies, the more 
strongly they have been exposed to Western European influence, for historical or 
geographical reasons. In this context, other two possible instruments could be 
common and civil law, translating the type of legal origin of each different country 
(see La Porta et al., 1998). 
3. ethnic fragmentation (ethnic) (from Alesina et al., 2003): on a broad level, the role 
of ethnic fragmentation in explaining the (possible) growth effect of democracy can 
be derived from the literature on the economic consequences of ethnic conflict. It 
has been shown that the level of trust is low in an ethnically divided society 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). Moreover, the lack of co-operative behaviour 
between diverse ethnic groups, leads to the tragedy of the commons as each group 
fights to divert common resources to non-productive activities (e.g. Mauro, 1995).20
Table 3 reports the results with the four proxies for government size defined in Section 
3 and splitting the sample into OECD, emerging and developing countries groups. 
Focusing on the full sample first we observe that the Gwartney and Lawson’s government 
size measure appears with a statistically significant negative coefficient.  When interacted 
with SAT it has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, meaning that in 
autocratic countries increased government size has greater negative effect on output 
growth. The reverse is true for democratic countries, whose negative impact of government 
size is mitigated but remains mostly negative. The remaining proxies keep the statistically 
negative coefficient, but interaction terms lose economic and statistical relevance. For the 
OECD sub-group the individual effects of the different proxies of government size are 
similar but interaction terms are never statistically significant. Developing countries report 
a statistically negative coefficient on government consumption expenditure and debt-to-
GDP ratio, with the latter having a lesser detrimental effect in democratic countries. All in 
all, government consumption is the proxy that is more consistently and clearly detrimental 
to output growth. 
[Table 3] 
_____________________________
20 Other similarly possible instruments are the historical settler mortality or population density in 1500, as in 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), the constitutional initiative which allows citizens to amend or demand a 
revision of the current constitution (as in Poterba, 1996), the share of population that speaks any major 
European language - Eurfrac -, inter alia. For the three instruments chosen the exclusion restriction is that 
durability, latitude and ethnic fragmentation do not have any impact on present economic growth other than 
their impact on democracy. 
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More stringent empirical tests on the role of democracy on the government size-growth 
relation were carried out, for robustness purposes (similarly to Rock, 2009). We defined 
“extreme” democratic transitions as those where the polity variable is greater than 5. In 
these instances, a new sustainable democratic transitions variable, SDT1 = 1 when polity >
5, otherwise SDT1 = 0. Similarly, a new sustainable autocratic transitions variable was 
created, SAT1 = 1 when polity < -5, otherwise SAT1 = 0. The logic behind this 
construction is to test for the impact of democracy and autocracy on growth in cases where 
countries’ governments are closer to either pure democracies or pure autocracies.21 Results 
(not shown) using the new SAT1 and SDT1 variables do not qualitatively change the 
results presented in Table 3 and discussed above. 
We also assessed the importance of political-institutional measures, specifically legal 
origins. From Table 4 a first general conclusion is that interaction terms with a 
Scandinavian legal origin dummy yields the higher (in absolute value) estimated 
coefficients (when significant), compared with other legal origins. More particularly, in 
specification 4 and 5, for the full sample and OECD respectively, the government debt-to-
GDP ratio and government size appear with a (statistically) negative coefficient; however, 
this effect on growth is mitigated particularly if a country has a Scandinavian legal origin. 
For developing countries, both French and British legal origins appear with statistically 
significant positive interaction term coefficients when the government size proxy is total 
government expenditures. 
 [Table 4] 
As suggested by Ram (1986) another possible specification is the use of the growth rate 
of the government size proxy. We also test this specification to determine its impact on 
growth across political systems or levels of institutional quality. All variables are retained 
except itG  that is now replaced by itit GdG / together with the corresponding interaction 
term. The results are presented in Table A1 in the Annex. Comparing with our previous 
results the coefficients of the linear term of government size proxies (apart from the debt-
to-GDP ratio) are positive and statistically significant in two specifications (2 and 5). 
According to Conte and Darrat (1988) Ram’s specification is suitable for testing short-term 
growth effects, while the specification used in this paper assesses the effects of government 
size on the underlying growth rate. Growth and development are long-run concepts 
whereas management of aggregate demand, a Keynesian prescription, is basically a short-
_____________________________
21 The cut-off point for defining these measures of democracy/autocracy was taken directly from Marshall 
and Jaeggers (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). 
19
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1399
November 2011
term concept. Hence, while short-term measures of government may have a positive 
impact on an economy, the impact of government on the underlying growth rate generally 
differs between political regimes and legal origins as found in this paper (a comparable 
robustness analysis is reported in Annex Table A2). 
Further in our inspection similar regressions, where the itI  variable is now replaced 
with the composite Freedom House index, were estimated.22 Two main results are worth 
mentioning: i) government size keeps its statistically significant negative sign, but its 
interaction with the Freedom House index yields a statistically negative coefficient (for the 
full sample), suggesting that the negative effect of government size on GDP per capita 
growth is stronger at lower levels of civil liberties and political rights; and ii) for the 
OECD sub-group debt has a statistically significant negative coefficient estimate and its 
interaction with the Freedom House index results in a negative estimate significant at 5 
percent level. 
4.3 Fiscal Rules 
In the context of the EU, Member States face a fiscal framework that asks for the 
implementation of sound fiscal policies, notably within the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) guidelines put forward in 1997. In fact, institutional restrictions to budgetary 
decision-making are a common feature of fiscal governance in advanced countries (see 
Hallerberg et al., 2007 for an overview). In addition to excess spending in the absence of 
such rules, previous literature also suggests that the so-called “common pool problem” 
may induce a pro-cyclical bias in fiscal policy (Tornell and Lane, 1999). Yet another 
rational for the implementation of such fiscal rules is to prevent policymakers from 
exacerbating macroeconomic volatility which is known to be detrimental to output growth. 
However, the Member States’ track records of effectively implementing fiscal rules have 
been mixed.23 Therefore, it is relevant to assess whether such fiscal rules, while aiming at 
improving fiscal positions, also play a role in fostering growth, particularly when 
interacted with different levels of government size. To our best knowledge such an 
empirical exercise has never been conducted.  
_____________________________
22 See Annex Table A3. 
23 A study by the European Commission (2006) points to significant heterogeneity of national fiscal 
frameworks within the EU and suggests that “stronger” fiscal rules are conducive to sound public finances 
(and ultimately more efficient and growth-enhancing economic policies). 
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Therefore, we use three indices constructed by the European Commission (overall rule 
index, expenditure rule index, and budget balance and debt rule index).24 Tables 5a and 5b 
report our findings between 1990-2008 using fixed-effects and system-GMM approaches, 
respectively. The former incorporates each index individually whereas the latter includes 
interacted terms between fiscal rules and government size proxies. 
[Tables 5a, 5b] 
Particularly under the total government expenditure and government spending 
specifications (4,5, 7, 8) we find statistically significant positive coefficients on the overall 
rule index and the expenditure rule index, meaning that having these fiscal numerical rules 
improves GDP growth for these set of EU countries. However, the government size proxy 
is never significant when these rules are included as additional regressors. When these 
rules are interacted with a relevant government size proxy, Table 5b, no coefficient is 
statistically significant. 
Finally, we also tested specifications with and without interaction terms, and with a 
simple splitting rule based on the country-average debt-to-GDP ratio over the entire time 
period being higher or lower than 60% (in line with the SGP threshold level). Such 
alternative does not change the statistical (in-)significance of our variables of interest 
(results not shown). 
4.4 Robustness Checks
One concern when working with time-series data is the possibility of spurious 
correlation between the variables of interest (Granger and Newbold, 1974). This situation 
arises when series are not stationary, that is, they contain stochastic trends as it is largely 
the case with GDP and investment series. The advantage of panel data integration is 
threefold: firstly, enables to by-pass the difficulty related to short spanned time series; 
secondly, the tests are more powerful than the conventional ones: thirdly, cross-section
information reduces the probability of a spurious regression (Barnerjee, 1999).25 Results of 
first (Im-Pesaran-Shin, 1997; Maddala-Wu, 1999) and second generation (Pesaran CIPS, 
_____________________________
24 These indices are normalized to have a zero mean and unit variance. They are based on a survey conducted 
by the Working Group on the Quality of Public Finances among practitioners and researchers in the field of 
fiscal policy. These measures bear strong appeal for empirical implementations as they translate a broad set 
of institutional provisions into a country-specific cardinal ranking (see Deburn at al., 2008, and Afonso and 
Hauptmeier, 2009 for details). 
25 Recall, additionally, that t-ratios are invalid for the estimations if error terms are nonstationary. 
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2007) panel integration tests are presented in the Annex (Tables A4 and A5).26 We can 
accept most conservatively that nonstationarity cannot be ruled out in our dataset. 
In face of this finding, it seems that the time-series properties of the data play an 
important role: we suggest that the bias in our models is the result of nonstationary errors, 
which are introduced into the fixed-effects and GMM equations by the imposition of 
parameter homogeneity. Hence, careful modelling of short-run dynamics requires a slightly 
different econometric approach. We assume that (8), or (9), represents the equilibrium 
which holds in the long-run, but that the dependent variable may deviate from its path in 
the short-run (due, e.g., to shocks that may be persistent). There are often good reasons to 
expect the long-run equilibrium relationships between variables to be similar across groups 
of countries, due e.g. to budget constraints or common technologies (unobserved TFP) 
influencing them in a similar way. In fact, in line with discussions in the empirical growth 
literature for modelling the “measure of our ignorance” we shall assume that the long-run 
relationship is composed of a country-specific level and a set of common factors with 
country-specific factor loadings.
The parameters of (8) and (9) can be obtained via recent panel data methods. Indeed, at 
the other extreme of panel procedures, based on the mean of the estimates (but not taking 
into account that certain parameters may be the same across groups), we have the Mean 
Group (MG)27 estimator (Pesaran and Smith, 1995) and as an intermediate approach the 
Pooled Mean Group (PMG)28 estimator, which involves both pooling and averaging 
(Pesaran et al., 1999). These estimators are appropriate for the analysis of dynamic panels 
with both large time and cross-section dimensions, and they have the advantage of 
accommodating both the long-run equilibrium and the possibly heterogeneous dynamic 
adjustment process.  
Therefore, a second step in our empirical approach is to make use of the Common 
Correlated Effects Pooled (CCEP) estimator that accounts for the presence of unobserved 
common factors by including cross-section averages of the dependent and independent 
variables in the regression equation and where averages are interacted with country-
dummies to allow for country-specific parameters. In the heterogeneous version, the 
_____________________________
26 For further details on these tests, the interested reader should refer to the original sources. 
27 The MG approach consists of estimating separate regressions for each country and computing averages of 
the country-specific coefficients (Evans, 1997; Lee et al., 1997). This allows for heterogeneity of all the 
parameters. 
28 This estimator allows the intercepts, short-run coefficients and error variances to differ freely across 
groups, but the long-run coefficients are constrained to be the same. The group-specific short-run coefficients 
and the common long-run coefficients are computed by the pooled maximum likelihood estimation. 
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Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG), the presence of unobserved common 
factors is achieved by construction and the estimates are obtained as averages of the 
individual estimates (Pesaran, 2006). A related and recently developed approach due to 
Eberhardt and Teal (2010) was termed Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator and it 
accounts for cross-sectional dependence by inclusion of a “common dynamic process”.29













11  (10) 
where ity is a scalar dependent variable, itx  is the 1k  vector of regressors for group i,
i represents the fixed effects, i is a scalar coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. 
i' ’s is the 1k vector of coefficients on explanatory variables, ij ’s are scalar 
coefficients on lagged first-differences of dependent variables, and ij ’s are 1k
coefficient vectors on first-differences of explanatory variables and their lagged values. We 
assume that the disturbances itu ’s in the ARDL model are independently distributed across 
i and t, with zero means and constant variances. Assuming that 0i for all i, there exists 
a long-run relationship between ity and itx  defined as: 
TtNiyy ititiit ,...,2,1;,...,2,1,' 1                      (11) 
where iii /'' is the 1k  vector of the long-run coefficients, and it ’s are stationary 












1  (12) 
where 1it is the error correction term given by (11), hence i  is the error correction 
coefficient measuring the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. 
Table 6.a presents our first set of robustness results, and it includes for each sub-sample 
both the PMG and MG estimates using different proxies for institutional quality entering in 
linear form together with the Gwartney and Lawson government size variable. For the 
OECD sub-group we get a positive and statistically significant coefficient on democracy in 
specification 4 and three statistically negative coefficients of government size when using 
the MG estimator. For both emerging and developing countries (Panels B and C) statistical 
_____________________________
29 We thank Markus Eberhardt for making his code available. 
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significance of government size is hard to find, but the institutional proxy is statistically 
significant for emerging countries (pr, political rights, and democracy), and for developing 
countries (cl, civil liberties). 
[Table 6.a] 
The MG estimator provides consistent estimates of the mean of the long-run 
coefficients, though these will be inefficient if slope homogeneity holds. Under long-run 
slope homogeneity, the pooled estimators are consistent and efficient. The hypothesis of 
homogeneity is tested empirically in all specifications using a Hausman-type test applied to 
the difference between MG and PMG. Under the null hypothesis the difference in the 
estimated coefficients between the MG and the PMG estimators is not significant and the 
PMG is more efficient. The p-value of such a test is also present in Table 6.a, and only for 
the OECD the null is rejected, being the MG estimator more efficient, and the long-run 
slope homogeneity rejected. 
In Table 6.b an equivalent set of results is presented but now with the integration term 
between government size and an institutional proxy of interest. In the case of the OECD 
the interaction term is negative and statistically significant for the polity indicator instance. 
However, the government size is not significant. In the case of developing countries, with 
the polity variable, government size negatively affects the level of per capita GDP, 
institutional quality appears with positive and statistically significant estimate and, we get 
a negative interaction coefficient. All in all, results using either PMG or MG estimators do 
not present extremely consistent evidence on the interactive effect of our variables of 
interest on the output level. 
[Table 6.b] 
In Table 7 we allow for both heterogeneous technology parameters and factor loadings 
as explained above, by running the CCEP, CCEMG and AMG estimators with and without 
interaction terms (where the institutional proxy variable is now given by the EMA_PCA 
variable as explained in Section 3). When running the AMG estimator for the OECD group 
we find some evidence of a statistically significant negative coefficient on the government 
size variable; while for the developing countries group we uncover only one statistically 
significant positive coefficient on the EMA-PCA variable, across methods.  
[Table 7] 
We redo the exercise but similarly to Tables 3 and 4 allow for other proxies of 
government size to play a role (see Table 8). Only estimated coefficients of the 
government size proxy, the institutional quality PCA-based measure and the interaction 
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term are reported for reasons of parsimony (full results are available upon request). We 
present different econometric specifications mainly for robustness and completeness. All in 
all, we get negative and statistically significant coefficients on total government 
expenditure, government consumption and public debt-to-GDP ratio irrespectively of the 
sample under scrutiny. We refrain from making a detailed analysis. Still, for instance, 
specifications 7 and 11 for the emerging and developing countries groups and with the 
government consumption as a proxy for government size show a negative effect of 
government consumption, and a positive effect of the PCA-based institutional measure. 
Finally, there is a negative interaction term: i) the negative effect of government 
consumption on GDP per capita is stronger at lower levels of institutional quality, and ii) 




We constructed a growth model with an explicit government role showing that more 
resources required to finance government spending reduce both the optimal level of private 
consumption and of output per worker. Following up on that theoretical motivation we 
perform an empirical panel analysis with 108 countries from 1970-2008, employing 
different proxies for government size and institutional quality. 
This paper adds to the literature in providing evidence on the issue of whether “too 
much” government is good or bad for economic progress and macroeconomic 
performance, particularly when associated with differentiated levels of (underlying) 
institutional quality and alternative political regimes.  
Moreover, we make use of recent panel data techniques that allow for the possibility of 
heterogeneous dynamic adjustment around the long-run equilibrium relationship as well as 
heterogeneous unobserved parameters and cross-sectional dependence (e.g. Pooled Mean 
Group, Mean Group, Common Correlated Pooled estimators, inter alia); vi) we also deal 
with potentially relevant endogeneity issues. 
Our results allow us to draw several conclusions regarding the effects on economic 
growth of the size of the government: i) there is a significant negative effect of the size of 
government on growth; ii) institutional quality has a significant positive impact on the 
level of real GDP per capita; iii) government consumption is consistently detrimental to 
output growth irrespective of the country sample considered (OECD, emerging and 
25
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1399
November 2011
developing countries); iv) moreover, the negative effect of government size on GDP per 
capita is stronger at lower levels of institutional quality, and the positive effect of 
institutional quality on GDP per capita is stronger at smaller levels of government size. 
Therefore, our empirical results are consistent with the growth model presented in the 
paper.
In addition, the negative effect on growth stemming from the government size 
variables is more attenuated for the case of Scandinavian legal origins, while the negative 
effect of government size on GDP per capita growth is stronger at lower levels of civil 
liberties and political rights.  
Finally, and for the EU countries, we find statistically significant positive coefficients 
on overall fiscal rule and expenditure rule indices, meaning that having better fiscal rules 
in place improves GDP growth.  
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Appendix A – Variables and sources 
Variable Definition/Description Acronym Source 
real GDP per capita  
Gdppc 
World Bank’s Word 
Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
gross fixed capital 
formation (% GDP) 
Gfcf_gdp WDI 
public investment (% 
GDP) Pubinv_gdp 




investment in PPP 
I Summers and 
Heston’s PWT 6.3 
Government size Composite variable (govsize). This variable includes government consumption 
expenditures (as percentage of total consumption), transfers and subsidies (as 
percentage of GDP), the underlying tax system (proxied by top marginal tax rates) 
and the number of government enterprises. 
govsize Gwartney and 
Lawson (2008) 
Central Government 
Debt (% GDP) 
Govdebt_gdp IMF (Abas et al., 
2010) 
Government budget 
surplus or deficit (% of 
GDP)
The government budget surplus or deficit as a percentage of GDP. 
Govbal_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, 
Easterly (2001) 
Total Government 
Expenditure (% GDP) 




Expenditure (% GDP) 
Govcons_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, 
Easterly (2001) 
Polity 2 The polity score is computed by subtracting the autoc score (autocracy index) from 
the democ score (democracy index); the resulting unified polity scale ranges from 
+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Refer to the database’s 
supporting documentation for more details. 
polity 
Marshall and 
Jaegger’s Polity’s 4 
database 
Political Rights Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including 
the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for 
public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who 
have a decisive impact  on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. 
pr Freedom House 
Civil Liberties Civil liberties include freedom of speech, expression and the press; freedom of 
religion; freedom of assembly and association; and the right to due judicial process. 
cl Freedom House 
corruption perception 
index 
The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the 
abuse of public office for private gain. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the 








This index combines two basic dimensions of democracy – competition and 
participation – measured as the percentage of votes not cast for the largest party 
(Competition) times the percentage of the population who actually voted in the 
election (Participation). 
demo Vanhanen (2005) 
governance index This is the result of averaging 6 variables: voice and accoutability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption. 
governance Kaufman et al. 
(2009)
legal origins English, French, German or Scandinavian  bri, fre, ger and 
sca La Porta et al., 1999 
Regime durability The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three point 
change in the p_polity score over a period of three years or less) or the end of 
transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a 
standardized authority score). 
Durable 
Marshall and 
Jaegger’s Polity’s 4 
database 
latitude latitude La Porta et al., 1999 
ethnic fragmentation Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will 
not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. The higher the number, the more 
fractionalized society. 
ethnic Alesina et al., 2003 
age dependency ratio 
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Appendix B – Model derivation 
We consider a typical economy with a constant elasticity of substitution utility function of the 









where c is per capita consumption,  is the intertemporal substitution and  is the (subjective) 
time discount rate or rate of time preference (a higher implies a smaller desirability of future 
consumption in terms of utility compared to utility obtained by current consumption. Population 
(which we assume identical to labour force, L) grows at the constant rate n, that is, tniit ieLL 0 .
Output in each country i at time t is determined by the following Cobb-Douglas production 
function:
1( ) ,0 1,  0 1,  0 1it it it it itY K G A L . (B2) 
Y is the final good, used for private consumption, G  is public consumption expenditure, 
which proxies for government size, and K  is the stock of physical capital. We consider the case of 
no depreciation of physical capital.  The output used to produce G  equals qG  (which one can 
think of as being equivalent to a crowding-out effect in private sector’s resources). A  is the level 
of technology and grows at the exogenous constant rate , that is, we have
iiti It
iit eAA 0  (B3) 
with itI  being a vector of institutional quality, political regime, legal origin and other related 
factors that may affect the level of technology and efficiency in country i at time t, and i  is a 
vector of (unknown) coefficients related to these variables. In this framework, the state of labour-
augmenting technology (A) depends not only on exogenous technological improvements 
determined by , but also on the level of institutional quality. 
We begin by writing down the resource constraint for this economy in per worker terms, given 
by: 
itttttttt nkqgcykqGCYK  (B4) 
where tK  is the time derivative of physical capital and small letters represent per worker terms 
(after scaling down by L).
We now write the conditions that characterize the optimal path for the economy and determine 
the steady-state solution for private and public consumption and income per worker. The optimal 
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By definition in the steady-state (SS) consumption is growing at a constant rate. Therefore, in the 
SS the right-hand side (RHS) of Eq. B14 has to be constant, which implies that technology and 
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k . Therefore, 
g
g
 is also equal to , as it is a weighted average of 
both k and A. 
Differentiating the production function (in per capita terms) with respect to time and dividing both 









)1(  (B17) 
Therefore, in the SS the rate of growth of output is also equal to , as it is a weighted average of 
k, g and A. 













t  (B18) 
We know that q and n are constant, 
k
k
 is constant and equal to  in the SS, y and g are growing at 








 are constant in the SS. Therefore, in the SS the RHS 
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Table 1.a: Results of OLS Estimation. With interaction terms. 
Sample Full 
Estimator Pooled OLS 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 7 8 7 8 
Institutional 
Proxy 
cl pr polity demo 






 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln k 0.942*** 0.908*** 0.941*** 1.032*** 0.999*** 1.031*** 1.086*** 1.025*** 1.080*** 0.954*** 0.905*** 0.958*** 







-0.027 -0.036 -0.028** -0.004 -0.067** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.050) (0.016) (0.017) (0.058) (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.014) (0.015) (0.031) 
I 0.220*** 0.201*** 0.255*** 0.112*** 0.107*** 0.120* 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.043** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.016** 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.064) (0.021) (0.018) (0.072) (0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) 
I*g   -0.006   -0.001   -0.004   -0.002* 


















  (0.092)   (0.100)   (0.098)   (0.085)  
Africa  -0.015   0.099   0.032   -0.011  
  (0.110)   (0.119)   (0.112)   (0.099)  
N 437 437 437 437 437 437 448 448 448 476 476 476 
R2 0.923 0.934 0.923 0.909 0.924 0.909 0.897 0.915 0.897 0.917 0.931 0.918 
 
Sample Full 
Estimator Pooled OLS 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 7 8 7 8 
Institutional 
Proxy 
cpi governance ps pc 
T -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln k 0.813*** 0.828*** 0.805*** 0.763*** 0.771*** 0.758*** 1.182*** 1.150*** 1.183*** 1.249*** 1.205*** 1.252*** 
 (0.048) (0.042) (0.047) (0.058) (0.055) (0.056) (0.045) (0.049) (0.045) (0.039) (0.047) (0.039) 
g -0.007 -0.003 -0.109** -0.039** -0.037* -
0.080*** 
-0.041* -0.009 -0.034* -0.039 -0.017 0.034 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.053) (0.018) (0.020) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.064) 
I 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.103** 0.563*** 0.574*** 0.240* 0.001 0.053* 0.085 0.182* 0.047 0.674 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.042) (0.061) (0.051) (0.126) (0.036) (0.032) (0.178) (0.109) (0.104) (0.425) 
I*g   -0.017**   -
0.054*** 
  -0.014   -0.084 
   (0.007)   (0.021)   (0.031)   (0.072) 













  (0.077)   (0.111)   (0.148)   (0.150)  
Africa  0.289***   0.219   0.126   0.062  
  (0.105)   (0.151)   (0.167)   (0.152)  
N 240 240 240 176 176 176 258 258 258 225 225 225 
R2 0.954 0.964 0.955 0.950 0.958 0.951 0.919 0.932 0.919 0.935 0.942 0.936 
Note: The models are estimated by Pooled OLS. The dependent variable is the logarithm of real GDP per capita. T stands for a time trend. Robust 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. A constant term has been estimated but it is not 
reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels.
 
Table 1b: Results of FE Estimation. With interaction terms. 
Sample Full 
Estimator FE 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Institutional 
Proxy 
cl pr polity demo 
T 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln k 0.691*** 0.692*** 0.687*** 0.688*** 0.575*** 0.574*** 0.609*** 0.605*** 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.077) (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) 
g -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.029** -0.038*** -0.018 -0.042** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.016) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) 
I 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.022 0.009*** 0.004 0.002 0.005* 
 (0.013) (0.036) (0.010) (0.028) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) 
I*g  0.003  0.006  -0.002*  -0.001** 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
N 437 437 437 437 448 448 476 476 









Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Institutional 
Proxy 
cpi governance ps pc 
T 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ln k 0.611*** 0.611*** 0.215 0.245* 0.586*** 0.582*** 0.588*** 0.590*** 
 (0.152) (0.151) (0.152) (0.130) (0.141) (0.141) (0.157) (0.154) 
g -0.002 -0.006 -0.015* -0.021** 0.033 -0.058*** 0.034 0.026 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.024) (0.020) (0.029) (0.059) 
I 0.004 0.012 0.128** 0.247** -0.032 0.256* -0.041 -0.094 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.061) (0.112) (0.041) (0.136) (0.040) (0.293) 
I*g  0.001  0.018  -0.043**  0.009 
  (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.054) 
N 240 240 176 176 258 258 225 225 
R2 0.722 0.723 0.468 0.488 0.767 0.785 0.748 0.748 
Note: The models are estimated by Fixed-Effects. The dependent variable is the logarithm of real GDP per capita. T stands for a time trend. Robust 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. A constant term has been estimated but it is not 
reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Table 2: Results of OLS and FE Estimation. With interaction terms. PCA-based 
institutional measure. 
Estimator OLS FE 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 
T 0.003 0.003 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln k 0.976*** 0.970*** 0.675*** 0.676*** 
 (0.048) (0.050) (0.079) (0.079) 
g -0.066*** -0.046* -0.018 -0.019 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) 
I 0.423*** 0.307*** -0.016 -0.029 
 (0.064) (0.113) (0.035) (0.057) 
I*g  0.029  0.003 
  (0.026)  (0.012) 
N 411 411 411 411 
R2 0.913 0.913 0.821 0.821 
Note: The models are estimated by Fixed-Effects. The dependent variable is the logarithm of real GDP per capita. T stands for a time trend. Robust 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. A constant term has been estimated but it is not 
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Table 5a: Results of Estimations of budgetary fiscal rules and controlling for endogeneity. 
Different Government size proxies (EU sample, 1990-2008) 
Sample. EU 
Estimation SYS-GMM 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
L.gdppc -7.23 -9.70 -9.54 -7.47*** -6.04** -4.98* -5.10 -4.69 -3.16 -0.46 0.55 1.24 
 (6.074) (5.991) (7.179) (2.745) (2.609) (2.872) (4.195) (4.319) (4.743) (4.420) (4.663) (3.951) 
gfcf_gdp 0.34 0.43*** 0.42** 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.54* 0.61* 0.58* 0.26* 0.27* 0.24* 
 (0.217) (0.151) (0.179) (0.195) (0.222) (0.208) (0.329) (0.312) (0.347) (0.134) (0.156) (0.142) 
Government 
size proxy 
govsize govsize govsize Totgovexpp Totgovexpp Totgovexpp Govcons Govcons Govcons Govdebt Govdebt Govdebt 
g 0.02 -0.57 -0.18 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.06 0.09 0.06 
 (0.528) (0.611) (0.555) (0.128) (0.105) (0.120) (0.507) (0.510) (0.484) (0.059) (0.075) (0.063) 
fisrulov 0.22   1.57**   1.77*   0.79   
 (1.017)   (0.760)   (1.068)   (0.736)   
exprulov  0.46   1.97*   2.70**   1.26  
  (0.828)   (1.176)   (1.346)   (1.013)  
bbdrulov   0.46   1.08   1.45   0.31 
   (0.893)   (1.023)   (1.420)   (0.895) 
             
Observations 87 87 87 259 259 259 306 306 306 285 285 285 
Hansen (p-
value) 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-
value) 
0.25 0.21 0.31 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.32 0.28 0.31 0.04 0.03 0.04 
AB AR(2) (p-
value) 
0.24 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.28 0.19 0.31 0.36 0.30 0.14 0.17 0.13 
Note: The models are estimated by system GMM (SYS-GMM). The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth.  Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying 
restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. Time fixed effects 
were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 
and 1% levels.
 
Table 5b: Results of Estimations of budgetary fiscal rules and controlling for endogeneity. 
Different Government size proxies (EU sample, 1990-2008) 
Sample. EU 
Estimation SYS-GMM 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
L.gdppc -6.55 -7.70 -7.77 -4.61 -4.36 -4.42 -4.34 -7.59 -5.98 0.69 0.53 4.08 
 (6.397) (5.902) (7.019) (2.882) (3.290) (4.068) (6.052) (6.288) (5.166) (4.014) (2.788) (3.356) 
gfcf_gdp 0.30* 0.47** 0.40* 0.32 0.24 0.24 0.62** 0.75** 0.65* 0.22* 0.32** 0.21 
 (0.168) (0.204) (0.209) (0.212) (0.204) (0.249) (0.289) (0.295) (0.351) (0.120) (0.139) (0.185) 
Government 
size proxy 
govsize govsize govsize Totgovexpp Totgovexpp Totgovexpp Govcons Govcons Govcons Govdebt Govdebt Govdebt 
g 0.56 -0.00 0.06 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 0.66 0.63 0.72 0.06 0.06 0.09 
 (0.923) (0.715) (0.519) (0.083) (0.108) (0.095) (0.604) (0.572) (0.507) (0.053) (0.059) (0.063) 
rule fiscal exp bb fiscal exp bb fiscal exp bb fiscal exp bb 
 2.98 2.97 0.89 -2.58 -1.59 -1.55 -2.77 -0.61 -7.13 -0.29 0.41 -0.75 
 (4.259) (2.648) (2.341) (3.358) (2.960) (2.875) (6.880) (6.039) (8.193) (2.240) (1.582) (1.733) 
interaction -0.50 -0.45 -0.14 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.14 0.45 0.01 0.00 0.01 
(0.703) (0.449) (0.441) (0.067) (0.070) (0.065) (0.336) (0.280) (0.443) (0.028) (0.019) (0.025) 
             
Observations 87 87 87 259 259 259 306 306 306 285 285 285 
Hansen (p-
value) 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-
value) 
0.23 0.20 0.26 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.04 0.04 0.04 
AB AR(2) (p-
value) 
0.20 0.09 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.27 0.34 0.20 0.12 0.21 0.08 
Note: The models are estimated by system GMM (SYS-GMM). The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth.  Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying 
restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. Time fixed effects 
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Table 6a: Results of Estimations allowing for heterogeneous technology parameters but 
homogeneous factor loadings (without interaction terms).  
Panel A         
Sample OECD 
Estimator PMG MG 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Institutional variable cl pr polity demo cl pr polity demo 
T 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln k 0.73*** 0.55*** 0.71*** 0.54*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.39*** 0.47*** 
 (0.090) (0.082) (0.085) (0.104) (0.101) (0.097) (0.068) (0.105) 
G -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02* -0.02** -0.01* -0.02 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) 
I 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.001** 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.013) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
Error Correction -0.75*** -0.46*** -0.79*** -0.65*** -0.57 -0.62 -0.88 -0.79 
(0.192) (0.156) (0.000) (0.000) (0.852) (0.904) (0.909) (0.837) 
Hausman  test for homogeneity (p-value) 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03     
Panel B         
Sample Emerging 
Estimator PMG MG 
Institutional variable cl pr polity demo cl pr polity demo 
T -.003 -.00 .01** -.00 .01 .02*** .02* .03** 
 (.006) (.005) (.004) (.009) (.011) (.005) (.008) (.015) 
ln k .88*** .94*** .76*** 1.33*** -.12 .28* -.09 -.69 
 (.173) (.163) (.200) (.340) (.642) (.155) (.391) (.544) 
G -.01 -.00 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.02 .01 .01 
 (.020) (.014) (.011) (.020) (.028) (.024) (.031) (.029) 
I .01 .02* -.01 .01* .02 -.02 .01 .00 
 (.007) (0.120) (.007) (.004) (.040) (.021) (.019) (.008) 
Error Correction -0.69*** -.72*** -.75*** .83*** -0.90*** -0.51 -0.71*** -.92*** 
(.000) (.001) (.000) (.002) (.172) (1.43) (0.181) (.177) 
Hausman  test for homogeneity (p-value) 0.31 0.02 0.31 0.26     
Panel C         
Sample Developing 
Estimator PMG MG 
Institutional variable cl pr polity demo cl pr polity demo 
T .002 .002 -.00 .004** .00 .00 .01* -.00 
 (.002) (.001) (.003) (.002) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
ln k .33*** .11 .63*** .45*** .81*** .79*** .52*** .68*** 
 (.091) (.110) (.109) (.113) (.255) (.234) (.193) (.230) 
g .01 .01 .003 .001 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02* 
 (.007) (.004) (.009) (.009) (.021) (.018) (.011) (.012) 
I -.01 -.01 .01 -.001 .03** -.02 .00 .003 
 (.008) (.012) (.012) (.002) (.016) (.016) (.020) (.003) 
Error Correction -.54*** -.18*** -.72*** -.60*** -.76*** -.71*** -.25 -.93*** 
(.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.085) (.088) (.249) (.128) 
Hausman  test for homogeneity (p-value) 0.11 0.85 0.15 0.18     
Note: The models are estimated by either PMG or MG estimators. The dependent variable is the logarithm of real GDP per capita. T stands for a time trend. 
Hausman test for homogeneity: under the null hypothesis the difference in the estimated coefficients between the MG and PMG estimators, it is not significant and 
PMG is more efficient. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Table 6b: Results of Estimations allowing for heterogeneous technology parameters but 
homogeneous factor loadings (with interaction terms).  
Panel A       
Sample OECD
Estimator PMG MG
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Institutional variable fh polity demo fh polity demo 
T -0.00 0.00 .01* 0.00 0.01*** .01*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (.002) (0.004) (0.002) (.002) 
ln k 0.73*** 0.44*** .52*** 0.89*** 0.41*** .44*** 
 (0.097) (0.099) (.094) (0.127) (0.074) (.103) 
g 0.05 0.00 .02 -0.11 -0.05 .01 
 (0.068) (0.005) (.158) (0.136) (0.057) (.114) 
I 0.06 0.01 .00 -0.15 -0.03 .00 
 (0.06) (0.008) (.018) (0.123) (0.034) (.014) 
I*g -0.01 -0.001* .00 0.01 0.00 -.00 
 (0.01) (0.001) (.003) (0.024) (0.005) (.002) 
Error Correction -0.67*** -0.40*** -.64*** -0.53 -0.94 -.75*** 
(0.102) (0.000) (.000) (0.848) (0.908) (.085) 
Hausman  test for homogeneity (p-value) 0.03 0.04 0.02    
Panel B       
Sample Emerging
Estimator PMG MG
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Institutional variable fh Polity demo fh polity demo 
T .002 .01 -.01 .01** .02* .02** 
 (.005) (.005) (.012) (.006) (.009) (.011) 
ln k .78*** .46*** 1.14** .44** -.14 -.41 
 (.166) (.173) (.468) (.178) (.400) (.389) 
g .09 .07 -.09 .10 .01 -.15 
 (.109) (.100) (.145) (.121) (.113) (.186) 
I .03 .05 -.02 .03 .01 -.02 
 (.129) (.056) (.023) (.140) (.056) (.022) 
I*g -.01 -.01 .01 -.01 .00 .01 
 (.030) (.012) (.005) (.034) (.015) (.007) 
Error Correction -.68*** -.67*** -.75*** -.60*** -.45* -0.20 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.182) (.23)  
Hausman  test for homogeneity (p-value) 0.65 0.34 0.06    
Panel C       
Sample Developing
Estimator PMG MG
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Institutional variable fh polity demo fh polity demo 
T .004 -.00 .00 .00 .00 -.00 
 (.003) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.007) 
ln k .33** .26 -.26 .34* .38* .88* 
 (.163) (.200) (.386) (.204) (.216) (.514) 
g -.34 -.16* -.07 .14 -1.34 -.06 
 (.297) (.091) (.060) (.229) (1.193) (.101) 
I -.20 .12* -.02 .09 1.31 -.07 
 (.202) (.063) (.016) (.159) (1.433) (.050) 
I*g .04 -.02* .00 -.02 -.18 .01 
 (.052) (.013) (.003) (.039) (.202) (.010) 
Error Correction -.60*** - .19*** -.11*** -.46*** -.51*** -.16 
(.001) (.000) (.000) (.471) (.129) (.520) 
Hausman  test for homogeneity (p-value) 0.09 0.03 0.01    
Note: The models are estimated by either PMG or MG estimators. The dependent variable is the logarithm of real GDP per capita. T stands for a time trend. 
Hausman test for homogeneity: under the null hypothesis the difference in the estimated coefficients between the MG and PMG estimators, it is not significant and 
PMG is more efficient. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Annex – additional results 
 
Table A1: Results of Estimations with FE and GMM. With interaction terms of New 
political systems’ measures. Different Government size proxies (first-differenced).  
Sample All 
Estimation Fixed Effects SYS-GMM 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
L.gdppc -4.70 -2.91*** -1.84*** -1.79*** 14.37** -7.88*** -2.69** -4.97*** 
 (4.148) (0.461) (0.306) (0.319) (6.618) (1.424) (1.294) (1.556) 
Gfcf_gdp -0.16** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.17*** -0.44*** 0.05 0.16*** 0.17*** 
 (0.082) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.147) (0.073) (0.063) (0.067) 
Government size proxy govsize Totgovexpp Govcons Govdebt govsize Totgovexpp Govcons Govdebt 
g 1.73 0.23* -0.10 -0.04*** 1.25*** 0.13 -0.06 -0.03*** 
 (1.729) (0.121) (0.216) (0.010) (0.403) (0.129) (0.265) (0.009) 
g*sat 0.37 0.34*** 0.25 0.01 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.02 
 (2.263) (0.127) (0.222) (0.013) (1.579) (0.144) (0.273) (0.016) 
g*sdt 1.71 0.45*** 0.09 -0.04*** 1.55 0.27** 0.09 -0.03*** 
 (1.821) (0.130) (0.222) (0.010) (0.977) (0.133) (0.268) (0.007) 
         
Observations 389 1,788 3,816 3,321 289 1,666 3,642 3,113 
R-squared 0.20 0.46 0.25 0.36     
Hansen (p-value)     0.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-value)     0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AB AR(2) (p-value)     0.32 0.00 0.00 0.10 
Note: The models are estimated by system GMM (SYS-GMM). The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth.  Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying 
restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. Time fixed effects 
were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 
and 1% levels. 
Table A2: Results of Estimations with FE and GMM. With interaction terms of legal 
origins’ type. Different Government size proxies (first-differenced).  
Sample All 
Estimation Fixed Effects SYS-GMM 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
L.gdppc -10.02** -2.87*** -1.89*** -1.67*** 10.46 -4.96*** -1.60 -3.84*** 
 (4.061) (0.441) (0.287) (0.299) (8.954) (1.403) (1.189) (1.337) 
gfcf_gdp -0.15* 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** -0.47*** 0.17** 0.19*** 0.11** 
 (0.084) (0.021) (0.013) (0.015) (0.148) (0.077) (0.053) (0.050) 
Government size proxy govsize Totgovexpp Govcons Govdebt govsize Totgovexpp Govcons Govdebt 
g 1.40 -0.03 -0.19* -0.05** 1.87 -0.02 -0.19 -0.05** 
 (1.448) (0.129) (0.099) (0.020) (1.221) (0.160) (0.188) (0.023) 
g*bri -1.27 -0.20 -0.18* -0.03 -1.23 -0.19 -0.14 -0.02 
 (1.832) (0.137) (0.112) (0.022) (2.250) (0.189) (0.275) (0.031) 
g*fre -1.44 0.01 -0.03 0.04** -1.60 0.03 0.03 0.05* 
 (1.594) (0.135) (0.112) (0.020) (1.698) (0.178) (0.198) (0.024) 
g*ger -1.37 -0.57* -2.94*** -0.28** -3.52 -0.59 -2.87** -0.34 
 (2.268) (0.329) (0.809) (0.130) (2.837) (0.457) (1.169) (0.221) 
g*sca -3.86* -0.67*** -1.43*** -0.13* -6.09*** -0.86** -1.50* -0.18 
 (2.334) (0.211) (0.479) (0.072) (2.034) (0.371) (0.791) (0.117) 
         
Observations 395 1,897 4,137 3,576 295 1,784 3,993 3,388 
R-squared 0.24 0.26 0.36 0.47     
Hansen (p-value)     0.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-value)     0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AB AR(2) (p-value)     0.33 0.00 0.00 0.03 
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Table A3: Results of Estimations controlling for endogeneity (with interaction terms of 
Freedom House).  
Estimation  Fixed Effects (within) SYS-GMM Fixed Effects (within) SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 











-1.29* -1.17 -1.35** -
1.01***
-0.54* -1.06 -2.24* -
1.14***
-0.31 -0.67 
 (0.460) (0.609) (0.539) (1.190) (0.813) (0.888) (0.733) (0.848) (0.539) (0.220) (0.317) (0.742) (1.214) (0.392) (0.620) (0.942)
Gfcf_gdp 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.17** 0.25*** 0.40*** 0.12*** 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.09 
 (0.027) (0.042) (0.033) (0.087) (0.055) (0.070) (0.068) (0.153) (0.036) (0.050) (0.051) (0.071) (0.073) (0.074) (0.076) (0.086)
govsize 1.03***    1.65***    0.47*    0.98**    
 (0.161)    (0.278)    (0.252)    (0.408)    
Govsize*fh -0.02**    0.00    -0.00    0.00    
 (0.010)    (0.027)    (0.014)    (0.031)    
Totgovexp_gdp  -0.07**    -0.09**    -
0.10***
   -
0.10***
  (0.026)    (0.045)    (0.025)    (0.029)   
Govexp*fh  -0.00    0.00    -0.00    0.00   
  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
Govcons_gdp   -0.05    0.12    -
0.25***
   -
0.45***
   (0.053)    (0.125)    (0.079)    (0.124)  
Govcons*fh   -
0.01***
   -0.02**    -0.01    -0.02  
   (0.004)    (0.010)    (0.011)    (0.017)  
Govdebt_gdp    -0.01    0.01    0.02    0.06** 
    (0.020)    (0.024)    (0.014)    (0.025) 
Govdebt*fh    -0.00    0.00    -0.01*    -
0.01**
    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.005) 
                 
Observations 860 538 1,111 335 738 415 935 234 224 192 225 154 194 162 195 124 
R-squared 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.12     0.16 0.21 0.18 0.06     
    0.14 0.58 0.01 0.41     1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
    0.33 0.08 0.91 0.52     0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Note: The models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE-within). The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth, as identified in the first row. Robust 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a 
constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels.
 
Table A4: First Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) Panel Unit Root Test (IPS) (a) 
 Real GDPpc  Investment (gfcf_gdp)  
Capital 
(k)  Labour 
in levels        
lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] 
OECD        
1.10 2.37 1.10 -4.09*** 1.55 3.87 0.63 4.49 
Emerging        
0.82 6.24 1.32 -3.90*** 1.92 -0.07 1.11 -2.71*** 
Developing        
1.17 4.03 1.02 -6.04*** 1.58 0.29 2.39 -5.56*** 
Maddala and Wu (1999) Panel Unit Root Test (MW) (b)
 Real GDPpc  Investment (gfcf_gdp)  
Capital 
(k)  Labour  
         
lags p (p) p (p) p (p) p (p)
in levels         
0 28.51 (1.00) 107.39 (0.08) 235.73 (0.00) 160.43 (0.00) 
1 36.24 (1.00) 185.60 (0.00) 85.24 (0.56) 51.88 (0.99) 
2 31.39 (1.00) 154.96 (1.00) 69.14 (0.93) 50.84 (0.99) 
in first 
differences         
0 497.79 (0.00) 660.58 (0.00) 834.39 (0.00) 533.44 (0.00) 
1 359.93 (0.00) 527.06 (0.00) 576.39 (0.00) 312.65 (0.00) 
2 260.52 (0.00) 378.98 (0.00) 345.99 (0.00) 169.39 (0.00) 
Notes: All variables are in logarithms. (a) We report the average of the country-specific “ideal” lag-augmentation (via AIC). We report the t-bar statistic, 
constructed as 
ii tNbart )/1( ( it are country ADF t-statistics). Under the null of all country series containing a nonstationary process this statistic has a 
non-standard distribution: the critical values (-1.73 for 5%, -1.69 for 10% significance level – distribution is approximately t) are reported in Table 2, Panel A of 
their paper. We indicate the cases where the null is rejected with **. (b) We report the MW statistic constructed as )log(2 ii pp ( ip are country ADF 
statistic p-values) for different lag-augmentations. Under the null of all country series containing a nonstationary process this statistic is distributed )2(2 N . We 
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Table A5: Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root Test (CIPS) 
 Real GDPpc  Investment (gfcf_gdp)  
Capital 
(k)  Labour  
lags p (p) p (p) p (p) p (p)
in levels         
0 4.23 (1.00) 1.87 (0.97) 8.97 (1.00) 6.18 (1.00) 
1 -1.49 (0.07) -0.57 (0.29) 2.44 (0.99) 4.67 (1.00) 
2 -0.37 (0.36) 2.488 (0.99) 4.29 (1.00) 5.43 (1.00) 
in first differences         
0 -11.05 (0.00) -16.39 (0.00) -18.81 (0.00) -10.29 (0.00) 
1 -6.77 (0.00) -11.91 (0.00) -11.83 (0.00) -5.05 (0.00) 
2 -1.81 (0.04) -7.80 (0.00) -6.46 (0.00) 0.03 (0.51) 
Notes: All variables are in logarithms. Null  hypothesis of non-stationarity. 
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